Longevity, Growth and Intergenerational Equity - The Deterministic Case by Torben M. Andersen & Marias H. Gestsson
October 2010
WORKING PAPER








Torben M. Andersen and Marias H. Gestsson 
Longevity, Growth and Intergenerational 
Equity - The Deterministic CaseCentral Bank of Iceland Working Papers are published by the Economics Departments of the Central Bank of 
Iceland. The views expressed in them are those of their authors and not necessarily the views of the Central 
Bank of Icleand.
Also available on the Central Bank of Iceland World Wide Web site (http://www.sedlabanki.is)
All rights reserved. May be reproduced or translated provided the source is stated.
ISSN 1028-9445Longevity, Growth and
Intergenerational Equity - The Deterministic Case￿
Torben M. Andersen
School of Economics and Management, Aarhus Universityy
CEPR, CESifo and IZA
Marias H. Gestsson
Central Bank of Icelandz
October 2010
Abstract
Challenges raised by ageing (increasing longevity) have prompted policy de-
bates featuring policy proposals justi￿ed by reference to some notion of inter-
generational equity. However, very di⁄erent policies ranging from pre-savings
to indexation of retirement ages have been justi￿ed in this way. We develop an
overlapping generations model in continuous time which encompasses di⁄erent
generations with di⁄erent mortality rates and thus longevity. Allowing for trend
increases in both longevity and productivity, we address the issue of intergener-
ational equity under a utilitarian criterion when future generations are better o⁄
in terms of both material and non-material well being. Increases in productivity
and longevity are shown to have very di⁄erent implications for intergenerational
distribution.
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11 Introduction
A trend increase in longevity is a major driver underlying demographic shifts in all
OECD countries. According to Wilmoth (2000), longevity (life expectancy at birth)
increased from 67 to 72 years for men and 75 to 79 years for women over the period
1970 to 1995. Further, according to recent UN forecasts (see United Nations, 2008) the
growth rate of longevity is expected to be 0.2 % per year. Hence, the e⁄ects are non-
trivial and a main cause behind projected increases in demographic dependency ratios.
The policy debate thus centres around the paradox that increases in longevity on the
one hand constitute a major welfare improvement1 and on the other hand threaten the
￿nancial viability of various welfare arrangements. To reap the bene￿ts of increased
longevity, policy adjustments are needed, and in policy debates it is often stressed that
the adjustments made should ensure intergenerational equity. But what is the precise
meaning attached to the notion of intergenerational equity when di⁄erent cohorts have
di⁄erent longevity? An issue which becomes even more complicated when taking into
account that future generations may also be richer due to productivity growth.
In policy formulations speci￿c proposals are often justi￿ed with reference to in-
tergenerational equity although this seems to lead to very di⁄erent implications. To
illustrate, the UK pension committee interpreted this to imply that retirement ages
should be proportional to longevity:
"Over the long run, fairness between generations suggests that average
pension ages should tend to rise proportionately in line with life expectancy,
with each generation facing the same proportion of life contributing to and
receiving state pensions" (UK Pensions Commission, 2005, p. 4).
In contrast the Swedish ￿scal policy framework has taken pre-saving or consolida-
tion of public ￿nances prior to changing demographics to be called for by intergener-
ational equity:2
"A current high level of public saving is basically motivated by the
need to ensure a more equal distribution of consumption possibilities across
generations" (Swedish Government, 2008, p 170).
The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of intergenerational equity when
overlapping generations have di⁄erent mortality and thus longevity. We approach this
from a utilitarian perspective (further discussed in section 6) and consider the socially
optimal allocation across generations. More precisely, the aim of the paper is to analyse
how consumption of produced goods and leisure should be allocated to individuals
belonging to di⁄erent generations. This paper can thus be seen as reverting to the
classical paper by Samuelson (1958) considering the social optimal allocation across
generations. The novel aspect in this paper is to allow for overlapping generations with
1The human development index (HDI) published by the UNDP has longevity to weight by 1/3
(see United Nations Development Programme, 2008).
2Balasonne et al. (2009) also argue that intergenerational equity calls for pre-savings. The now
common metric of ￿scal sustainability S2 (see e.g. European Commission (2006, 2009)) giving the
needed permanent change in the primary budget balance implies pre-savings if the underlying demo-
graphic changes cause a trend deterioration in the primary budget balance.
2di⁄erent mortality and thus longevity. Rather than appealing to money as a social
contrivance, we assume a small open economy facing a given (and time invariant)
interest rate at which consumption possibility can be intertemporally substituted (see
section 6). This also allows us to avoid the complications arising when endogenizing
the capital stock (see Diamond, 1965).
In a seminal paper, Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) consider the role of mortality for
the social optimal allocation (utilitarian) in a continuous time setting with an age
dependent survival rate.3 Basic consumption smoothing arguments imply that the
social optimum has consumption to be invariant to age. The models presented in
Sheshinski (2006, 2008) allow comparison between allocation of two individuals with
di⁄erent survival rates, which gives that consumption smoothing entails redistribution
from individuals with high mortality (low longevity) to individuals with low mortal-
ity (high longevity). However, the issue of retirement (and thus leisure on par with
consumption) is not considered.
This paper makes two important extensions to the abovementioned papers. First,
we consider di⁄erent mortality rates across generations, capturing the empirically ob-
served trend increase in longevity. This implies that demographics are in transition
over time/generations, precluding a steady state analysis. The overlap and redistribu-
tion across generations with di⁄erent mortality (longevity) raise particular modelling
issues which cannot be handled in standard models or by comparing steady state
equilibrium under various assumptions concerning longevity. We present a model in
continuous time in which there is overlap of cohorts with di⁄erent mortality paths
and thus longevity.4 Second, allowing for changes in longevity makes the usual OLG
simpli￿cation of dividing life length in periods of exogenous length denoted "young"
and "old" dubious. We allow for an endogenous determination of these phases of life
by including the retirement age as an endogenous variable under rather general spec-
i￿cations of the utility functions, which enables us to capture various age and health
e⁄ects. The endogeneity of the retirement age implies that the economic environment
may display certain stationarity properties, although the underlying demographics do
not necessarily do so. To focus on the issue of longevity, we assume fertility to be
constant, implying that all demographic shifts are generated by changes in mortality
rates.
We link changes in longevity explicitly to changes in mortality rates which are co-
hort speci￿c. Hence, we allow for a trend increase and an overlap of generations with
di⁄erent survival rates (and thus longevity). The speci￿c modelling of mortality rates
is inspired by the approach in Boucekkine et al. (2002) featuring age/cohort speci￿c
mortality rates.5 This approach can be seen as a generalization of the Yaari-Blanchard
approach assuming stochastic survival with age independent survival rates (see Blan-
3They also allow the social planner to weight the utility of future generations di⁄erently than
implied by the subjective discount rate of the individuals. In the egalitarian or pure utilitarian case
where the two are the same, the ￿ at consumption pro￿le follows.
4These issues have also been addressed in standard two-period overlapping generations models
where longevity changes are interpreted as extending the length of the second period by Auerbach
and Hasset (2007) and Andersen (2008).
5Heijdra and Romp (2008) adopt a similar approach. Both modelling approaches give a fairly
good approximation to observed mortality rates. The main di⁄erence is that here there is a given
maximum age, while in the Heijdra and Romp (2008) model survival approaches zero in the limit for
a high age.
3chard, 1985). The latter is obviously in contradiction to the empirical evidence,6 and
the formulation adopted here captures that mortality rates are (almost) constant (and
low) up to a certain age after which they are increasing in age.7 We take mortality
rates to be exogenous to focus on the basic issues on intergenerational equity when
di⁄erent cohorts have di⁄erent longevity.
This paper is organized as follows: The modelling of demographics including trend
changes in mortality rates is laid out in section 2 together with the speci￿cation of
individual utility functions. The social planner allocation problem under a utilitarian
social welfare function is formulated and analysed in section 3, and the optimal allo-
cation is interpreted in section 4. Decentralization of this allocation is discussed in
section 5. Finally, a few concluding remarks are given in section 6.
2 An Overlapping Generations Model with Cohort
Dependent Longevity
Consider a setting in continuous time where a given (and constant) number of indi-
viduals are born at each instant. Individual life time is stochastic, but the fraction of
a given cohort surviving is deterministic. The survival rates and thus longevity (life
expectancy at birth) are allowed to change over time and thus to di⁄er across cohorts.
Hence, overlapping generations alive at a given point in time di⁄er not only in age but
also longevity. Life has two phases "young" and "old", where young refers to the phase
in life when individuals are working, and old refers to the phased when they are not
working (retired). The length of these two phases is endogenous since the retirement
age is a choice variable. The social planner (utilitarian) decides on consumption and
work (retirement) pro￿les; that is, allocations across "young" and "old" at a given
point in time and across time under the intertemporal resource/budget constraint.
The economy is small and open in global capital markets, implying that the interest
rate r is exogenous, and for simplicity, assumed time-invariant.8
2.1 Demographics
2.1.1 Survival functions
The number of individuals born at each point in time is assumed to be constant
and normalized to 1. Following Boucekkine et al. (2002), it is assumed that the
unconditional probability for an individual born in time t of reaching age a (the survival
6This holds when mortality rates apply to individuals, as is the case in this paper. When these
apply to families, the assumption of constant mortality rates is more acceptable as is discussed in
Blanchard (1985).
7This is in accordance with empirical evidence, see e.g. Wilmoth (2000).
8This is a simplifying assumption since increases in longevity are a global phenomenon, and it is
likely that increased longevity results in changes in the world interest rates. Whether it results in
higher or lower rates is, however, generally uncertain. Some empirical studies do show evidence of
a positive relationship between longevity and aggregate savings (see discussion in Sheshinski, 2008).
This implies that interest rates decrease as longevity increases.
4rate) is given by the following function:9




where ￿ > 1, ￿ (t) < 0 and a 2 [0;A(t)], where A(t) is the highest age any member





To incorporate demographic shifts in the model, the parameter ￿ (t) is assumed to be
time dependent. Hence, the maximum age A(t) is also time dependent.







Note that m(0;A(t)) = 1, i.e., there is no infant mortality, and m(A(t);A(t)) = 0,
implying that A(t) is the highest age any member of the cohort born at t can reach,
as is discussed above.
In the following we term this maximum age for a given cohort the longevity for the

























































The survival rate is strictly decreasing and concave in age. Combining this with
the results above implies that m(a;A(t)) 2 [0;1], i.e., the survival rates are between
zero and one. Moreover, it is strictly increasing in longevity, and the e⁄ect of higher
longevity on the survival rate is increasing in age. Hence, an increase in longevity
of a cohort results in higher survival probabilities at every age, but the increase is
greater the older an individual is. These properties are independent of the value of
the parameter ￿ (as long as ￿ > 1). The survival rate function is illustrated in ￿gure
1. The ￿gure also shows that greater longevity A(￿) > A(s) for a generation born
at ￿ than a generation born at s implies an outward shift in the survival curve from
the full line (corresponding to A(s)) to the dotted line (corresponding to A(￿)), and
hence the survival to any age is non-decreasing in longevity.
9This function captures the "rectangular" shape of the data based survival curve shown in Wilmoth
(2000).
10This holds since lim
￿!1+ [￿ln￿ ￿ [￿ ￿ 1]] = 0,
@[￿ln￿￿[￿￿1]]
@￿ = ln￿ > 0 and, hence, ￿ln￿ ￿
[￿ ￿ 1] > 0 8 ￿ > 1.
11Note that ￿
@m(a;A(t))
@a is the unconditional probability of passing away at the age of a for an




Figure 1: Survival rates for di⁄erent cohorts with di⁄erent longevity
In accordance with empirical evidence (see introduction), we assume that there is
a trend increase in longevity.12 Hence, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Longevity of the generation born at time t, i.e., A(t), follows the
process:
dA(t) = ￿A (t)dt ; ￿A (t) ￿ 0 (2.5)
Hence, longevity of the generation born at some time t relates to longevity for the
generation born at s < t as
A(t) = A(s) +
t Z
j=s
￿A (j)dj for t ￿ s
Equation (2.5) implies that each new generation has a longevity that is no less than
that of the previous generation. Further, it is assumed that
@￿A(t)
@t ￿ 0, i.e., growth
in longevity is non-increasing over time.13 Note that since we can have ￿A (t) = 0 for
some t and
@￿A(t)
@t ￿ 0 for all t, it follows that a special case of this setup is one where
there is an upper bound to longevity.
As is discussed above, longevity of an individual born at time t is denoted by A(t).
Hence, longevity of an individual aged a in time t is denoted by A(t￿a) since he is born
at time t￿a. At any point in time, the last person from some generation passes away,
12Historically, there has been a trend increase in longevity (see Oeppen and Vaubel (2002)), and
demographic evidence does not show signs that human life spans are approaching ￿xed limits imposed
by biology or other factors, see also Wilmoth (2000) and Christensen et al. (2009).
13The idea is that the growth in longevity is non-increasing in longevity. Since there is a one-to-
one relationship between longevity and time in the model, this is identical to having the growth in
longevity non-increasing in time. In appendix E we show how the results of the paper generalize to
the case where there is a constant upward trend in longevity to some upper bound:
dA(t) = ￿Adt for A(t) < A
dA(t) = 0 for A(t) = A
All qualitative results in the paper hold under this assumption.
6i.e., the generation becomes extinct. At time t this happens for the generation born at
time t ￿ ~ A(t) with longevity ~ A(t), i.e., ~ A(t) denotes the longevity of the generation
that becomes extinct at time t. Using this and (2.5), longevity of the generation aged
a at time t relates to longevity of the generation that becomes extinct at time t as
A(t ￿ a) = ~ A(t) +
t￿a Z
j=t￿ ~ A(t)
￿A (j)dj for ~ A(t) ￿ a ￿ 0 (2.6)
Conveniently, this relation allows us to restate the survival probability function






￿ m(a;A(t ￿ a)) (2.7)





1 and ~ m
￿
~ A(t); ~ A(t)
￿
= 0. Moreover14
@ ~ m(a; ~ A(t))
@a < 0
@2 ~ m(a; ~ A(t))
@a2 < 0
@ ~ m(a; ~ A(t))
@A(t￿A) > 0
@2 ~ m(a; ~ A(t))
@A(t￿A)@a > 0









and, hence, its integral exists. These properties are
important since they ensure that the population size, the number of young and the
number of old individuals are well de￿ned in the model.
2.1.2 Population composition
While the birth rate is constant, the population size is not, since survival rates and
longevity change. Since, by assumption, 1 individual is born at each point in time, the




. Hence, the total population at









The retirement age of an individual born at time t is denoted by R(t). It follows
that we may classify individuals born at time t as young when their age is between 0
and R(t), i.e., a 2 [0;R(t)], and old when their age is between R(t) and the maximum
age A(t), i.e., a 2 (R(t);A(t)]. Further, the retirement age of an individual aged a
in time t is denoted by R(t ￿ a) since he is born at time t ￿ a. At any point in time,
individuals from some generation retire. At time t this happens for the generation
born at time t ￿ ~ R(t) with retirement age ~ R(t), i.e., ~ R(t) denotes the retirement age
of the generation that retires at time t. It follows that individuals aged between 0 and




, are young at time t, and individuals aged between ~ R(t) and
14The derivatives are shown in appendix A.
7~ A(t), i.e., a 2
￿
~ R(t); ~ A(t)
i
, are old at time t. Note that the retirement age is allowed
to depend on time and thus to be cohort speci￿c.























~ R(t); ~ A(t)
￿
> 0 (2.10)
Hence, both the number of young and the number of old individuals at time t can be
expressed as functions of longevity of the generation that becomes extinct at time t,
i.e., ~ A(t), and the retirement age of the generation that retires at time t, i.e., ~ R(t).
Obviously, total population size is given as N (t) = Nw (t) + No (t) as can be veri￿ed
from (2.8), (2.9) and (2.10).












~ R(t); ~ A(t)
￿ ￿ K
￿
~ R(t); ~ A(t)
￿
(2.11)
Note that even though demographic stock variables need not be stationary due to a
trend increase in longevity, it follows that compositional variables like the dependency
ratio may be stationary since they depend crucially on how the retirement age responds
to demographic changes. This turns out to be crucial below.
We can now work out how the upward trend in longevity (2.5) a⁄ects the key
demographic variables N (t), Nw (t), No (t) and K (t). We have (see appendix B) that
both the number of young and the number of old increase (for a given retirement
age ~ R(t)). The latter is straightforward, and the former arises because an increase in
longevity implies a decrease in mortality rates at all ages (see ￿gure 1). However the
number of old individuals increases by more than the number of young individuals,
and hence we have that the dependency ratio unambiguously increases. In summary,
we have:
dN (t) > 0
dNw (t) > 0
dNo (t) > 0
dK (t) > 0
Note that ~ R(t) is endogenous in the social planner￿ s maximization problem and, hence,
so are Nw (t), No (t) and K (t). This prevents the dependency ratio K (t) becoming
in￿nitely large over time.
15This may be termed the economic dependency ratio since it depends on the retirement age which
is endogenous, and not some exogenously given age.
82.2 Individual utility
Individuals consume as young and old, but work as young only. Utility is in the
standard way speci￿ed over consumption and leisure. However, allowing for changes
in mortality rates and thus implicitly in health status across di⁄erent generations
implies that one has to consider carefully the speci￿cation of the utility function to
capture essential age and health e⁄ects on the disutility from work and the value of
leisure time. The standard approach features age independent and constant disutility
from work (exogenous working hours) or utility from leisure, and hence retirement in-
volves a trade-o⁄between consumption and leisure along the extensive margin (see e.g.
Sheshinski (1978), Crawford and Lilien (1981) and Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil (2002)).
While this trade-o⁄ is fundamental, it is problematic to assume disutility from work
and utility from leisure to be age invariant, in particular when analysing changes in
mortality and longevity which are clearly related to health. We propose a more gen-
eral formulation allowing for both age and health e⁄ects on the disutility from work
as well as utility from other forms of time uses. This is summarized in the utility
generated from time uses taking into account various possible time consuming activ-
ities like work, leisure activities, rest etc. We make the assumption that the value of
time (disutility from work and value of time spent on leisure activities) for working
and retired persons depends negatively on age a and positively on health captured by
longevity A(t ￿ a).
The utility function for a young (working) individual aged a at time t is given as
a separable function speci￿ed over consumption16 cw (t) and time, i.e.,





where U is strictly increasing and concave. The function L captures the value of
time17 taking into account both leisure and working time for the young individual.18
The value of time is assumed to be decreasing in age and increasing in longevity
16Assuming that the marginal utility of consumption is dependent on age would create a question
of optimal distribution of taxes (consumption) among young individuals, on one hand, and among
old individuals, on the other. Hence, we assume that it is independent of age as is implied by the
separable formulation adopted here.
17Think of time being spent on three main types of activities: (i) work (hw), (ii) leisure activities
such as travel, sports, hobbies, home production (ht) and (iii) rest (hr), where hw + ht + hr = 1;
i.e. the available time is normalized to one, and the various time uses are exogenous. Using the time
constraint, the utility from time use measured relative to time spent on the fall back option "rest"
can be written as
L(a;A) = ￿w(a;A)[hw ￿ hr] + ￿t(a;A)[ht ￿ hr]
where ￿w and ￿t give the respective marginal values of time spent on work and leisure activities.
Assuming that @￿w
@a < 0 and @￿t
@a < 0 corresponds to less utility from work (more disutility from
work) and leisure activities with age, while @￿w
@A > 0 and @￿t
@A > 0 implies that the utility from work
(disutility decreases) and utility from leisure activities increase at any age a when longevity increases.
Note that the formulation allows for ￿w(a;A) being positive for some values of (a;A), implying that
people up to some limit like to work; e.g. to use skills and quali￿cation acquired in education.
18Bloom et al. (2006) use a similar speci￿cation to capture the disutility from work: v (z;t), where
z is life expectancy, or longevity, and t is age. They propose that the v function is homogeneous of
degree zero, which can be interpreted as re￿ ecting healthy ageing (see section 4).







The idea behind this is that health and the ability to enjoy time (working or spent
on leisure activities etc.) worsen with age, while increasing with longevity. Hence, the
value of time for a young individual aged a is greater when longevity of his generation
is A1(t￿a) years than if it is A2(t￿a) < A1(t￿a) years.19 This can be justi￿ed using
￿gure 1, which shows that increased longevity results in increased survival rates at
all ages implying better health, while survival rates decrease with age implying worse
health.
The utility of an old (retired) individual aged a at time t is given as
Wo(t;a) = Q(co (t)) + H (a;A(t ￿ a)) 8 a 2
￿
~ R(t); ~ A(t)
i
(2.15)
where Q is strictly increasing and concave in consumption co (t) and the function H
captures the value of time to old individuals (similar to the L function for the young).
Using the same justi￿cation as for young, it is assumed that the value of time to old
individuals is decreasing in age but increasing in longevity:
@H (a;A(t ￿ a))
@a
< 0 (2.16)
@H (a;A(t ￿ a))
@A(t ￿ a)
> 0 (2.17)
The speci￿cation here allows for di⁄erent utility functions de￿ned over consumption
and time for young and old. While the latter follows straightforwardly given disutility










@H (a;A(t ￿ a))
@A(t ￿ a)
(2.19)
Note that retirement in general involves a trade-o⁄ between consumption (life-time
income increases with the retirement age) and utility from time uses (disutility from
work). Consider the latter which involves the utility from time uses as young and old
(L and H), respectively, where both an age and a longevity e⁄ect are involved. The
age e⁄ect (2.18) says that the value of time as working decreases more than the value
of time as retired; that is, the gain in the value of time as retired relative to working
19In the case of the function being homogenous of degree zero, as is proposed in Bloom et al. (2006),
the value of time for a 40 year old individual with longevity 80 years for his generation is the same
as the value of time for a 50 year old with longevity 100 years for his generation.
20As a special case, we also present results for the case where the utility de￿ned over consumption
is the same for young and old below.
10increases with age21. The longevity e⁄ect (2.19) says that increased longevity tends to
increase the value of time more as working than retired; that is, the gain in value of
time of retiring at a given age decreases with longevity22. The latter captures a health
e⁄ect in the sense that higher longevity is associated with better health reducing the
disutility from work at a given age, ceteris paribus. Note that assuming that the utility
from time when young is greater than when old (L > H ) implies that (2.18) ensures
that, at some age level a￿, the value of time as old becomes greater than the value of
time as young (working), i.e., L < H for all a > a￿ which provides a "leisure" motive
to retirement.
In the following it turns out to be more convenient to analyse the model when
the value of leisure is expressed in terms of the longevity of the generation becoming










￿ H (a;A(t ￿ a))
where A(t ￿ a) is given in (2.6), and hence utilities for young and old are given as















































It is easily veri￿ed that this changes none of the qualitative insights from above. Note
that (2.18) and (2.19) are readily shown to hold for the modi￿ed values of time for
young and old (e L, e H), i.e., @~ L
@a < @ ~ H
@a and @~ L
@ ~ A(t) > @ ~ H
@ ~ A(t) hold.
2.3 Productivity
The earnings capability is assumed exogenous but to be a⁄ected by productivity
growth. Hence, we set forth the following assumption:
21This could, for example, be due to the fact that working often becomes more physically challenging
when individuals become older and their health worsens.
22This is consistent with empirical evidence found by Haliday and Podor (2009) showing that
improvements in health status have large and positive e⁄ects on time allocated to home and market
production and large negative e⁄ects on time spent on watching TV, sleeping, and consumption of
other types of leisure activities.
11Assumption 2. Output of a young individual at time t, i.e., y (t), follows the
process
dy (t) = ￿yy (t)dt ; ￿y > 0 (2.20)
Total output in the economy Nw (t)y (t) is endogenous since Nw (t) is endogenous.
Note that productivity is only included for comparative purposes, allowing a compar-
ison of intergenerational distribution arising due to di⁄erent longevity or economic
possibilities across cohorts.
2.4 Planner allocation
The social planner decides on consumption and work (retirement age). It is easiest to
characterize and interpret the social planner allocation if it is cast in terms of taxes
and transfers relative to the reference outcome where individuals consume their labour
income. Hence, consumption of a young and an old individual, respectively, at time t
is:
cw (t) = y (t) ￿ Tw (t) (2.21)
co (t) = To (t) (2.22)
where Tw (t) is net taxes paid by a young individual, and To (t) is net transfers to an old
individual at time t. We cast the model in this way both because it is analytically more
tractable and because it gives a simple relation to the analysis of social security schemes
in standard two-period OLG models. Further, since y (t) is exogenous, choosing Tw (t)
and To (t) is tantamount to choosing cw (t) and co (t) in the model.
We have made the informational restriction that the social planner can not make
taxes and transfers age dependent, but only dependent on labour market status (work-
ing or not working). This can be motivated in terms of information- and transactions
costs, which apparently are large in reality since actual schemes in general satisfy the
condition imposed here. Hence, at a given point in time, the social planner has to
collect the same amount of tax from each young (working) individual and give the
same amount of transfer to each old (retired)23. Since output of each young individual
is only time dependent, it follows from (2.21) and (2.22) that, at a given point in
time, consumption of each young and each old individual is independent of age. This
￿ts with the speci￿cation of the utility functions from above; i.e., that the marginal
utility from consumption is independent of age (see U(￿) and Q(￿) in (2.12) and (2.15),
respectively).
The policy package thus includes three elements, namely, the tax levied on the
young (working), the transfer to the old (retired) and the retirement age. The policy
problem is thus to choose
n
Tw (i);To (i); ~ R(i)
o1
i=t
at each point in time t.
The primary budget balance of this scheme in any period t reads
B (t) = Nw (t)Tw (t) ￿ No (t)To (t) (2.23)
23Hence, the social planner is not able to choose a consumption pro￿le for each generation at the
birth of the generation as in Calvo and Obstfeld (1988).






where r is the interest rate. From (2.24), debt dynamics can be written
dD(t) ￿ D(t + dt) ￿ D(t)
= rdtD(t) ￿ B (t)dt
= [rD(t) ￿ B (t)]dt (2.25)
where it is used that er ￿ 1 + r.
3 Social Optimum
We consider the social optimum under a utilitarian criterion.25 While this criterion is
neither unproblematic nor uncontroversial, it is useful to illustrate some basic trade-o⁄s
arising, and we consider it as a useful benchmark case for studying intergenerational
distribution, cf. discussion in section 6.
The objective of the social planner at time t is to maximize the sum of the present
values of lifetime utilities of generations born at time t or later and the present value of






















24This constraint makes the economy-wide resource constraint hold.
25Note that it is more accurate to call this a constrained social optimum since the social planner
is constrained by having to collect the same amount of tax from each young individual and give the
same amount of transfer to each old one.
26The time separability and exponential discounting following Yaari (1965) imply that problems of
time inconsistency do not arise and that agents display risk neutrality with respect to the length of
life (see Bommier (2006) and Bommier et al. (2009)).

















for all t￿ ~ R(t) > i ￿ t￿ ~ A(t), where Ww(i+a) and Wo(i+a) are given in (2.12) and
(2.15). As is shown in appendix C, (3.1) is well de￿ned.
We assume that the social planner discounts at the same subjective rate as individ-
uals (￿) which may be considered the "pure" utilitarian case where utility achieved at
any point in time gets the same weight irrespective of who obtains the utility. Under
the utilitarian criterion, (3.1) gives the same welfare measure as is obtained by calcu-
lating the present value of instantaneous utility generated to all living individuals (see























where (2.6) and (2.7) are used.






subject to the budget constraint from (2.24) (and (2.23)) and given (2.5) and (2.20).
The problem is solved by setting up the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
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d ~ A = ^ ￿Adt
dy = ￿yydt (3.4)




an interior solution, this gives the following ￿rst-order conditions for the optimal Tw,
To and ~ R, respectively:28
VD(￿) = ￿U
0 (y ￿ Tw) (3.5)
VD(￿) = ￿Q
0 (To) (3.6)
[Tw + To]VD(￿) = U (y ￿ Tw) + ~ L
￿
~ R; ~ A
￿
￿ Q(To) ￿ ~ H
￿
~ R; ~ A
￿
(3.7)
Further, this gives the following law of motion for the marginal value function:
dVD(￿) = (￿ ￿ r)VDdt (3.8)
3.1 Neutral generational weighting
The relation between the subjective (￿) and the objective (r) discount rates determines
whether the marginal value function is decreasing or increasing over time, cf. (3.8).
Similar to models of intertemporal consumption choices, a subjective discount rate
higher (lower) than the objective discount rate implies a pro￿le for consumption that
is decreasing (increasing) over time, see e.g. Blanchard and Fischer (1989). This
source of reallocation across time and thus generations is standard. In the following
we therefore only consider the case where the subjective and objective (world market)
discount rates are identical ￿ = r. This may also be interpreted as a case of neutral
generational weighting in the sense that the subjective and objective discount rates are
equal. Hence, discounting per se does not imply any pro￿le bene￿tting current or future
27Setting a = 0 in (2.6) gives the relationship between longevity of the generation born today and
the generation that passes away today. Taking total di⁄erence of this, using (2.5) and rearranging
gives d ~ A(i) =
￿A(i￿ ~ A)
1+￿A(i￿ ~ A)di.
28The ￿rst-order conditions and the law of motion for the marginal value function are derived in
appendix D. Further, it is shown there that (i) the ￿rst-order conditions are necessary and su¢ cient
for solving the maximization problem in (3.4) and (ii) the HJB equation and the budget constraint
in (2.24) (and (2.23)) are necessary for solving (3.3).
15generations in a particular way. In short we refer to this case as neutral generational
weighting. Under this assumption we have (relaxing the short hand writing)
dVD
￿
D(i);y (i); ~ A(i)
￿
= 0 (3.9)
for all i ￿ t, i.e., the optimal policy package is such that the marginal value function
VD(￿) is the same for all i ￿ t.
Applying this to (3.5)-(3.7) gives
VD (t) = ￿U
0 (y (i) ￿ Tw (i)) (3.10)
VD (t) = ￿Q
0 (To (i)) (3.11)
and
[Tw (i) + To (i)]VD (t)
= U (y (i) ￿ Tw (i)) + ~ L
￿
~ R(i); ~ A(i)
￿
￿Q(To (i)) ￿ ~ H
￿
~ R(i); ~ A(i)
￿
(3.12)
for all i ￿ t, where VD (t) is written as a function of t to indicate that it is the same
for all i ￿ t.
3.2 Optimal policy package
An optimal policy package
n
Tw (i);To (i); ~ R(i)
o1
i=t
must satisfy (3.10)-(3.12) as well


























~ R(i); ~ A(i)
￿
are given in (2.9) and (2.10). Hence, the
optimal policy package satis￿es conditions for ￿scal sustainability (see e.g. European
Commission, 2006).
Proposition 1. The social optimum implies that the following holds for any growth
rates of longevity ￿A (i) and output ￿y from assumptions 1 and 2, respectively:
(i) Taxes and transfers:





To (i) = To (t) (3.14)
for all i ￿ t.
(ii) Consumption:
cw (i) = cw (t)
co (i) = co (t) (3.15)
16for all i ￿ t.
(iii) Retirement:
d ~ R(i) = ￿y (i)dy (i) + ￿A (i)d ~ A(i)
where
￿y (i), ￿A (i) > 0 (3.16)
for all i ￿ t.
Proof. See appendix F.
According to proposition 1, the tax payment of young individuals is given as some
time invariant component plus the income growth since time t, i.e., all income growth
is fully taxed. Old individuals receive a time invariant transfer. This implies that the
consumption level of both the young and the old is constant over time. Income growth
is thus smoothed across generations; that is, it a⁄ects the overall level of consumption
but not the pro￿le (note the assumption ￿ = r). To put it di⁄erently, current and
future generations all share the gains from future productivity increases in terms of a
higher consumption level.
According to (3.10) and (3.11), the optimal policy implies that marginal utility of
consumption is equal for young and old, i.e.,
U




0 (cw (i)) = Q
0 (co (i))
from (2.21) and (2.22), capturing the well-known ￿nding that a utilitarian policy maker
redistributes to ensure equal marginal utilities of consumption (income). If utility
functions over consumption are the same for young and old U(￿) = Q(￿), it is an
immediate implication that they will have the same consumption level. This generalizes
the Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) result to a setting with time varying mortality rates
and thus di⁄erent longevity across generations (and income growth). If the marginal
utility of consumption is higher when working (for young individuals), the solution
implies that the consumption level for young individuals is greater than that of old
ones.
The results above on consumption are neither surprising nor new since they follow
straightforwardly from standard consumption smoothing arguments under separable
utility. More interesting and novel are the implications for the retirement age. Two
issues are important here, namely, the level of the retirement age and its pro￿le over
time (due to growth in productivity and longevity). The former is discussed in section
5 where allocation under social optimum is compared to allocation under individual
decision making, while results for the latter are stated in proposition 1 and discussed
below.
Consider the two drivers, productivity growth and increasing longevity. First, we
have that productivity growth unambiguously implies that the retirement age should
be increasing over time since
@ ~ R(i)
@y(i) > 0 from (3.16) and since output is increasing over
time from (2.20). The intuition is that the generations with the higher productivity
should work more than generations with lower productivity. Hence, while productivity
growth implies a front-loading of consumption in the sense that both current and future
17generations bene￿t from productivity growth in terms of a higher consumption level,
it implies a rising pro￿le for the retirement age and thus a shift of the work load onto
future generations.
Second, the e⁄ect of increasing longevity on the retirement age implies that the
retirement age should increase over time since
@ ~ R(i)





i ￿ ~ R
￿ > 0 (3.17)
that is, generations with greater longevity should retire later. This re￿ ects that higher
longevity (better health) decreases the direct utility gain from retirement (from (2.19)),
and therefore retirement is delayed. The retirement age increases basically due to
better health measured in terms of the value of time. Hence, although longevity does
not in￿ uence the consumption pro￿les for working and retired persons, it does in￿ uence
retirement ages.
To conclude, longevity and productivity do not a⁄ect the socially optimal con-
sumption pro￿les (development of over time) while they do a⁄ect the retirement age
pro￿le.
4 Implications
As discussed in the introduction, policies are often motivated by reference to some
notion on intergenerational equity, although this has been interpreted in quite di⁄erent
ways. This section interprets the properties of the social optimum in relation to some
of these policy views.
4.1 Retirement and healthy ageing
Consider ￿rst the perception that intergenerational equity implies that the retirement
age should evolve proportionally to longevity. We consider under which assumptions
this is implied by the socially optimal policy derived above and how these are related to
the notion of healthy ageing. This argument involves only longevity, and we therefore
disregard productivity growth, i.e., dy (i) = 0.
The ￿rst result is given in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Given homogeneity of the ~ L and ~ H functions, the social optimum
implies that
~ R(i) = ￿ ~ A(i) (4.1)
for all i ￿ t where ￿ is some constant (> 0), i⁄ the ~ L and ~ H functions are homoge-
neous of degree zero.
Proof. See appendix G.
Hence, for the class of homogeneous ~ L and ~ H functions, only those that are homo-
geneous of degree zero imply a retirement age proportional to longevity in the social
optimum.
Lemma 1 gives the conditions that need to be ful￿lled for the social optimum to
imply that the retirement age should be proportional to longevity of the generation that
becomes extinct today. Intuitively the retirement age should be related to the longevity
18of the generation retiring rather than the longevity of the generation becoming extinct.
The following lemma shows an equivalence:
Lemma 2. Given constant growth in longevity, there exist ￿ and   (< ￿) such
that
~ R(i) = ￿ ~ A(i) iff ~ R(i) =  A
￿
i ￿ ~ R
￿
for all i ￿ t.
Proof. See appendix G.
Hence, given constant growth in longevity, a retirement age proportional to longevity
of the generation that becomes extinct today ( ~ A(i)) is equivalent to the retirement age
being proportional to the longevity of the generation that retires today (A
￿
i ￿ ~ R
￿
).
Therefore lemma 1 also gives the necessary conditions that need to be ful￿lled for
the social optimum to imply the retirement age being proportional to longevity of the
generation that retires today.
Consider healthy ageing in the sense that the health conditions at a given age
improve proportionally with longevity. That is, the direct utility consequences of
retirement at age a0 for a person belonging to a generation with longevity A(0) are
the same as the consequences of retiring at an age a1 = a0
A(1)
A(0) for a person from a
generation with longevity A(1) (6= A(0)).29 This is implied in the present setup if
the L and H functions are homogeneous of degree zero,30 which is implied by zero
homogeneity of the ~ L and ~ H functions when there is constant growth in longevity, as
the following lemma shows:
Lemma 3. Given constant growth in longevity, the ~ L and ~ H functions are homo-
geneous of degree ￿ i⁄ the L and H functions are homogeneous of degree ￿.
Proof. See appendix G.
This leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Given constant growth in longevity and homogeneity of the L and
H functions, social optimum implies
~ R(i) = ￿ ~ A(i)
~ R(i) =  A
￿
i ￿ ~ R
￿
for all i ￿ t where ￿ and   are positive constants (  < ￿), i⁄ the L and H functions
are homogeneous of degree zero (healthy ageing).
Proof. See appendix G.
Hence, for the class of homogeneous L and H functions, only those that are ho-
mogeneous of degree zero imply a social optimal retirement age that is proportional
to longevity. This is driven by the fact that the direct utility consequences (disutility
from work, utility from leisure) at retirement are constant under the above notion of
healthy ageing when the retirement age is proportional to longevity. To phrase it dif-
ferently, a future generation with longer longevity can retire proportionally later at the
same utility consequences as current generations with shorter longevity retiring earlier.
Hence, the view that a retirement age proportional to longevity is in accordance with
intergenerational equity holds under this notion of healthy ageing, but not generally.
29In e.g. OECD (2006) healthy ageing is interpreted in the sense that the need for health care and
thus age dependent health expenditures shift proportionally with longevity to higher ages.
30The homogeneity assumption is made in e.g. Bloom et al. (2006) and Andersen (2009).
194.2 Dependency ratio
Policy debates centre around the dependency ratio for the obvious reason that it gives
the balance between contributing and receiving persons in a Pay-As-You-Go type
scheme. The basic problem is that ageing for unchanged policies implies an increasing
dependency ratio and worsening budget balance, cf. section 2 and (2.23). When the
retirement age is a policy instrument, the choice of the retirement age may ensure that
a balance between the share of population working and non-working is maintained.
Hence, even if demographic stock variables may display non-stationarity, it does not
necessarily follow that the key economic variable - the dependency ratio - does so. We
therefore consider the implications of the socially optimal policy for the dependency
ratio.




d ~ R(i) +
@K(i)
@ ~ A(i)
d ~ A(i) (4.2)
for all i ￿ t. We have already shown in section 2 that @K
@ ~ A(i) > 0, and obviously a higher











@ ~ R(i) [Nw (i) + No (i)]
Nw (i)
2 < 0 (4.3)
since @Nw
@ ~ R(i) = ￿ @No
@ ~ R(i) > 0.
The case of productivity growth is trivial. In this case ~ A(i) is constant and the
retirement age is increasing, cf. from (3.16). Hence, the dependency ratio is declining.
The following proceeds under the assumption that productivity growth is zero, i.e.,












for all i ￿ t. This underlines that the dependency ratio increases unless the optimal
policy implies a su¢ ciently strong increase in the retirement age. The question is thus
whether this is implied by the socially optimal policy and which conditions need to be
met for it to hold.
To address this issue, we consider the case where growth in longevity is constant.
Under the assumption of zero growth in productivity, we have from (3.14) that To (i) =
To (t) and Tw (i) = Tw (t) for all i ￿ t. Using this in (3.12) implies that the development
of retirement age over time under the social optimal policy can be written as a function
of longevity only





for all i ￿ t and where we, by use of (3.16), have R0 > 0. This implies that there exists
a function for the development of relative retirement age over time, i.e., retirement age









for all i ￿ t. Note that we have ￿
0 = 0 and ~ R0 = ￿(i) = ￿ (a constant from before) in
the case of a retirement age proportional to longevity. In general, we have the following
relationship between the relative retirement age and the dependency ratio:
Lemma 4. Given constant growth in longevity,
@K
@ ~ A(i)
T 0 iff ￿
0 S 0
for all i ￿ t.
Proof. See appendix H.
Hence, if social optimal policy is such that the relative retirement age increases
following an increase in longevity, then the dependency ratio decreases. It follows
directly that if the retirement age is proportional to longevity, ￿
0 = 0, we have @K
@ ~ A(i) = 0.
In this case the social optimal policy implies that the dependency ratio is constant over
time. Combining this with the results from last section gives:
Corollary 1. Given constant growth in longevity and healthy ageing, the social
optimum implies that the dependency ratio is constant over time.
The so-called retirement-consumption puzzle states that consumption when young
is greater than when old. This is ensured if U(cw (i)) ￿ Q(co (i)) holds in the social
optimal solution. Assuming this gives the following:
Lemma 5. Given (i) constant growth in longevity, (ii) that utility from consump-
tion when young is no less than when old, and (iii) that the L and H functions are
homogeneous of degree ￿, where ￿ is su¢ ciently close to zero, it holds that
￿
0 S 0 iff ￿ T 0
for all i ￿ t.
Proof. See appendix H.
Hence, if homogeneity is less than zero, the socially optimal policy is such that
the relative retirement age increases over time. This leads to the following proposition
which has corollary 1 as a special case:31
Proposition 3. Given (i) constant growth in longevity, (ii) that utility from
consumption when young is no less than when old, and (iii) that the L and H functions




T 0 iff ￿ T 0
for all i ￿ t.
Proof. See appendix H.
Hence, the dependency ratio is increasing (decreasing, constant) over time under
socially optimal policy if the homogeneity of the L and H functions is greater than
(less than, equal to) zero. Hence, only in the case of healthy ageing do we have that
the socially optimal policy implies a constant dependency ratio.
31Note that corollary 1 does not require an assumption concerning the utilities from consumption.
214.3 Pre-saving
The idea of pre-savings is very predominant in debates on how to cope with the
￿nancial problems arising from increasing dependency ratios. The argument is that
consolidation of the government￿ s budget is needed in advance of expenditure increases
driven by the demographic transitions. This is sometimes phrased in the way that
"unpaid bills should not be left in the nursing room". While such consolidation may
seem common sense, it is less obvious from a normative perspective taking into account
that future generations may enjoy both higher productivity and longevity. The present
framework makes it possible to address this issue.
Having formulated the problem in terms of taxes and transfers makes it possible to
assess the extent of intergenerational redistribution by considering the budget pro￿le.
From (2.9), (2.10) and (2.23) we have that the primary budget balance at time i reads
B (i) = Nw
￿
~ R(i); ~ A(i)
￿
Tw (i) ￿ No
￿
~ R(i); ~ A(i)
￿
To (i) (4.7)
for all i ￿ t. Taking total di⁄erence and using (3.14), (2.9) and (2.10) give
dB (i) =
h
[Tw (i) + To (t)] ~ m
￿







@Nw( ~ R(i); ~ A(i))
@ ~ A(i)
￿To (t)








~ R(i); ~ A(i)
￿i
dy (i) (4.8)
for all i ￿ t, where Tw (i) is given by (3.14) and it has been used that dTo (i) = 0 and
~ m
￿
~ A(i); ~ A(i)
￿
= 0.
Considering (4.8), we have three channels a⁄ecting the evolution of the budget
balance, namely (i) a higher retirement age improves the budget balance since more
individuals work and pay taxes and fewer individuals are retired and receive transfers,
(ii) the direct e⁄ect of ageing (increasing longevity) is in general ambiguous since it
both implies more young (working) individuals and thus higher tax revenue, and more
old (retired) individuals and thus expenditures on transfers, and (iii) productivity
growth improves the budget via improved tax revenue.
Consider ￿rst the case with productivity growth only, i.e., d ~ A(i) = 0. Point (iii)
above implies positive e⁄ects of productivity growth on the budget balance. In addition
to this, productivity growth has positive e⁄ects on the retirement age and, hence,
on the budget balance under optimal policy from (3.16). It can thus be concluded
that productivity growth unambiguously implies an "upward" pro￿le for the primary
budget balance; that is, the budget balance improves over time. Hence, productivity
growth tends to imply current borrowing to be matched by future savings (i.e. no
pre-savings). The intuition for this derives directly from the consumption smoothing
implied by the optimal policy since if all generations are to share the fruits of future
productivity growth then intertemporal substitution calls for current borrowing.
We now turn to the role of increasing longevity in the absence of productivity
growth, i.e., dy (i) = 0. To simplify, assume moreover that the initial debt level is
zero, i.e., D(t) = 0. This enables us to determine whether pre-saving is an optimal
policy by looking at the primary budget balance at time t, i.e., B (t).
22Consider the expression for the budget balance (4.7) rewritten in terms of the
dependency ratio from (2.11)
B(i) =
h
Tw (i) ￿ K
￿






~ R(i); ~ A(i)
￿
for all i ￿ t. Note that in the absence of productivity growth we have Tw (i) = Tw (t)
and To (i) = To (t) 8 i ￿ t from (3.14). Hence,
dB(i) = ￿To (t)Nw
￿





Tw (t) ￿ K
￿









d ~ R(i) +
@Nw
@ ~ A(i)
d ~ A(i) > 0
since @Nw
@ ~ A(i) > 0, @Nw
@ ~ R(i) > 0 and d ~ R(i) > 0 from (3.16).
Observe ￿rst that if the optimal policy implies that the dependency ratio is con-
stant, i.e., @K
@ ~ A(i) = 0, as is the case when there is constant growth in longevity and
healthy ageing (from corollary 1), then it follows that the primary budget must balance
in all periods to satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint in (3.13), i.e.,
Tw (t) ￿ K
￿
~ R(i); ~ A(i)
￿
To (t) = 0
Hence, the initial primary budget balance is zero B (t) = 0 and remains so, and pre-
saving is not implied by social optimal policy.
More generally, if the optimal policy implies that @K
@ ~ A(i) > 0, we must have that the
primary budget balance at t is positive, i.e.,
Tw (t) ￿ K
￿
~ R(t); ~ A(t)
￿
To (t) > 0
since dNw(￿) > 0 and (3.13) must hold. Hence, pre-saving is an optimal policy if the
dependency ratio is increasing over time. However, if the social optimal policy is such
that @K
@ ~ A(i) < 0, we must have the converse
Tw (t) ￿ K
￿
~ R(t); ~ A(t)
￿
To (t) < 0
since dNw(￿) > 0 and (3.13) must hold.
Hence, for pre-saving to be implied by social optimal policy, the dependency ra-
tio must increase with longevity (after adjustment of the retirement age) over time.
Connecting this to the results obtained above, this indicates that it is necessary that
the value of time functions for the young and old is homogeneous of a degree greater
than zero for pre-saving to be an optimal policy. These results are summarized in the
following:
Summary 1. Given (i) constant growth in longevity, (ii) that utility from con-
sumption when young is greater than when old and (iii) that the L and H functions are
23homogeneous of degree ￿, where ￿ is su¢ ciently close to zero, social optimum implies
that
Homogeneity Dependency ratio Pre-saving
￿ < 0 @K
@ ~ A(i) < 0 No
￿ = 0 @K
@ ~ A(i) = 0 No
￿ > 0 @K
@ ~ A(i) > 0 Yes
As this discussion indicates, it is not generally the case that pre-saving is implied
by the social optimal policy. In the benchmark case of healthy ageing, the dependency
ratio is constant, and provided an initial budget balance, there are no intergenerational
transfers.32 Further, relaxing the assumption of zero growth in productivity, it becomes
less likely that pre-saving can be a social optimal policy since productivity growth
implies current borrowing ￿nanced by future savings to smooth consumption.
5 Decentralized Equilibrium
Finally, consider the question whether the socially optimal allocation can be decen-
tralized. Two aspects arise here. First, the social optimum involves transfers across
generations, and hence it is crucial whether these can be made in the decentralized
equilibrium. Secondly, in the decentralized case individuals choose not only consump-
tion but also the retirement age given the transfers and taxes determined by the policy
maker.
Consider ￿rst the issue of intergenerational transfers. In an OLG setting with age
heterogeneity wrt. mortality risk and perfect annuities markets to insure individuals
against uncertain lifetimes, Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) showed that the social optimal
allocation can be decentralized provided there is a su¢ ciently rich set of age and time
dependent instruments. In that setting, longevity and output are constant over time
and the population is stationary. Similarly, Sheshinski (2008) shows that a ￿rst best
solution is obtained in decentralized equilibrium when annuities markets are available
to insure individuals against uncertain lifetime. In that setup, there are no intergen-
erational di⁄erences; i.e., output and longevity are constant over time.
An interesting question here concerns the retirement decision. Are individual in-
centives underlying retirement the same as for the social planner? They are not when
consumption levels are di⁄erent since marginal utilities are di⁄erent. If consumption
levels are the same, there is a di⁄erence if taxes and transfer are distortionary. In the
model presented here, the socially optimal allocation implies that intergenerational
transfers are needed. Therefore, even though perfect annuities markets exist, taxes
and transfers are needed when trying to restore the socially optimal allocation.
In the following we brie￿ y analyse whether the socially optimal allocation from sec-
tion 3 can be achieved as a decentralized equilibrium when perfect annuities markets
are available, generations are heterogeneous wrt. longevity, and the government can
use taxes levied on young individuals and transfers to old individuals to make inter-
generational transfers. To solve for the decentralized equilibrium, we follow Sheshinski
(2008) in how the individual￿ s problem is set up. An individual chooses consumption
32The case of healthy ageing implies the optimality of a balanced budget and, hence, implies the
optimality of a Pay-As-You-Go type scheme.
24and retirement conditional on taxes and transfers levied on individuals. The govern-
ment then chooses taxes and transfers now and in the future. Description of the model
and derivation of the decentralized equilibrium are shown in appendixes I, J and K.
Note the di⁄erence to previous sections. Before, the social planner was choosing n
Tw (i);To (i); ~ R(i)
o1
i=t
, but now the government￿ s policy package is fTw (i);To (i)g
1
i=t,





(as well as consumption).
Hence, the government has a smaller set of instruments in the decentralized equilib-
rium.
5.1 Retirement age
Compare ￿rst the socially optimal retirement decisions and retirement in the decen-
tralized equilibrium. Consider an arbitrary generation born at time t0. According to
the decentralized equilibrium, this generation retires at time i > t0 at the age of Rd,
while, according to the social planner￿ s allocation, the generation retires at time j > t0
at the age Rs.33
If we assume that the same consumption levels are arising in the social planner￿ s
and decentralized equilibrium allocation (partial equilibrium, direct e⁄ects), we have
that the retirement age di⁄ers since34
Rs R Rd for Tw (i) + To (i) R 0 (5.1)
The intuition is that the tax-transfer scheme introduces a distortion of the retirement
decision in the decentralized equilibrium. The composite marginal tax e⁄ect of retir-
ing is Tw (i) + To (i) in the decentralized equilibrium, and hence retirement decisions
di⁄er between the social optimum and the decentralized allocation. The direction of
these e⁄ects depends on the sum of taxes and transfers at every point in time in the
decentralized equilibrium. Both of these are likely to be positive.
This is, however, only a part of the story since consumption in the decentralized
equilibrium is dependent on (i) taxes and transfers and (ii) the retirement age (con-
sumption e⁄ects), as is shown in appendix I. Hence, one needs to derive the general
equilibrium e⁄ects to give the full story. Let us therefore relax the assumption of
identical consumption levels in the social planner￿ s and decentralized equilibrium allo-
cations. Instead, think of the following question: How does the retirement age change
when the economy moves away from the social planner￿ s solution? It can be shown (see
appendix L) that the retirement age tends to decline when Tw (i) + To (i) is positive.
This underscores the role of the distortion of individual retirement decisions arising in
decentralized equilibrium.
5.2 Can the social planner allocation be attained in decen-
tralized equilibrium?
The results above imply that even though consumption is equal under the two schemes,
the retirement age in the decentralized equilibrium will di⁄er from the social planner￿ s
33Hence, t0 = i ￿ Rd = j ￿ Rs.
34This is shown in appendix L.
25solution as long as the sum of taxes and transfers is non-zero. This is a strong indication
that the social planner￿ s allocation can not be attained in the decentralized equilibrium.
More formally, we have the following proposition35:
Proposition 4. Even given annuities markets, the socially optimal allocation can
not in general be decentralized.
Proof. See appendix L.
Note that this holds despite the presence of annuities markets, which eliminate the
distortion caused by uncertain lifetime. Relaxing the assumption of annuities markets
would make it even less likely that the social planner￿ s allocation could be attained in
the decentralized equilibrium.
6 Concluding Remarks
The notion of intergenerational equity has been considered under a utilitarian crite-
rion in an overlapping generations model allowing for both productivity growth and
increasing longevity. The latter is the more interesting aspect both because of its
relevance in relation to current debates on demographics and because it requires a
modelling approach allowing for overlapping generations with di⁄erent mortality rates
and thus longevity. As in Calvo and Obstfeld (1988), the social optimal allocation is
found under generational neutral weighting to imply consumption smoothing across
generations and time; i.e., young and old have the same consumption ￿ ows at all times.
This is a straightforward implication of intertemporal substitution under the utilitar-
ian criterion and with separable utility functions. However, in addition the retirement
age di⁄ers across generations, and both productivity growth and increasing longevity
tend to call for increasing retirement ages over time. The former holds generally and
derives from increasing labour input when its marginal productivity is high, while the
latter follows under mild conditions amounting to increasing longevity being re￿ ected
in better health at given ages.
In policy debates strong assertions are often made on the implications of intergener-
ational equity such as retirement ages to follow longevity proportionally or pre-savings.
We show that the former holds under so-called healthy ageing, while the latter arises if
the retirement age does not increase su¢ ciently to avoid an increasing (economic) de-
pendency ratio. Note that even if the socially optimal policy implies some pre-savings,
the needed savings are a⁄ected by the fact that retirement ages increase across gener-
ations due to increasing longevity.
Intergenerational distribution and equity have been considered from a utilitarian
perspective. Utilitarianism is the dominating approach in welfare analyses, and for
comparative purposes it is thus a natural starting point for addressing the issue of
changing mortality rates (and productivity). Working out the implications of utili-
tarianism makes it easier to discuss its pros and cons. It should be noted that the
analysis assumes the same underlying utility function across generations weighted in
a way that does not imply any generational preference or bias. The criticism of util-
itarianism (see e.g. Konow (2003) for a survey and references) includes aspects such
35Necessary conditions for allocation in the decentralized equilibrium being the same as the so-
cial planner￿ s only hold when the number of young individuals is very close to the number of old
individuals, which gives the above proposition.
26as inter-personal (generational) comparability of utility (cardinal measurement) and
consequentialism assessing only outcomes measured in terms of utility disregarding the
underlying process or elements a⁄ecting well-being. Utilitarianism implies redistribu-
tion based on the ability to generate utility at the margin (marginal utilities) rather
than the level of utility per se. This is re￿ ected in the present analysis, and it may be
questioned whether future generations should work more (retire later) because they
have higher longevity and are more productive.
This paper has taken mortality rates to be exogenous. While this is a natural start-
ing point to clarify the basic issues involved, it is also clear that changes in mortality
rates and thus longevity are driven by both individual (life style, eating habits, housing
etc) and public decisions (health care). A small but growing literature is exploring the
consequences of endogenizing longevity via these channels (see Philipson and Becker
(1998), Leroux et al. (2008)). It is an obvious agenda for future research to endogenize
mortality rates
Finally, a small-open economy assumption has been adopted with respect to ￿-
nancial markets. This is a reasonable assumption to make for most countries given
￿nancial globalization. Consequences of changes in the interest rate pro￿le can readily
be analysed within the model. Since ageing is a global phenomenon, there is however
an issue with respect to how ageing itself and the induced policy changes will a⁄ect
global interest rates. While countries acting non-cooperatively take interest rates as
exogenous, important interdependencies are likely to exist. An interesting topic for
future research would be to analyse these issues.
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30Appendix
A. Derivatives of the ￿ m function
The derivatives are the following:
@ ~ m(a; ~ A(t))










@2 ~ m(a; ~ A(t))
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@ ~ m(a; ~ A(t))






@2 ~ m(a; ~ A(t))

















where A(t ￿ a) is given in (2.6).
B. Calculations for population composition
dN (t) > 0, dNw (t) > 0 and dNw (t) > 0. Applying Taylor approximation to
(2.8), (2.9) and (2.10), and erasing terms that contain "dt" raised to a higher power
than 1 (since time is continuous (dt ! 0)) give the following:
dN (t) = @N






@ ~ m(a; ~ A(t))
@ ~ A(t) da
3
7
5d ~ A(t) > 0
dNw (t) = @Nw
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3
7
5d ~ A(t) > 0
dNo (t) = @No






@ ~ m(a; ~ A(t))
@ ~ A(t) da
3
7
5d ~ A(t) > 0
where (2.5) and properties of the ~ m function (from appendix A) are used. Hence,
dN (t) > 0, dNw (t) > 0 and dNo (t) > 0 all hold.
Proof of dK (t) > 0
Applying Taylor approximation to (2.11) and erasing terms that contain "dt" raised
to a higher power than 1 (since time is continuous (dt ! 0)) give the following:
dK (t) =
@No
@ ~ A(t)Nw(t)￿No(t) @Nw
@ ~ A(t)




















or, by using (2.9) and (2.10)
31~ A(t) Z
a= ~ R(t)
@ ~ m(a; ~ A(t))
@ ~ A(t) da
~ A(t) Z
a= ~ R(t)




@ ~ m(a; ~ A(t))
@ ~ A(t) da
~ R(t) Z
a=0
~ m(a; ~ A(t))da
(B.1)
Since
@ ~ m(a; ~ A(t))
@a < 0 and
@2 ~ m(a; ~ A(t))
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32=
@ ~ m(a; ~ A(t))
@ ~ A(t) a= ~ R(t)
~ m( ~ R(t); ~ A(t))
=
~ R(t)
@ ~ m(a; ~ A(t))
@ ~ A(t) a= ~ R(t)




@ ~ m(a; ~ A(t))
@ ~ A(t) da
~ R(t) Z
a=0
~ m(a; ~ A(t))da
Hence, (B.1) holds as well as dK (t) > 0. This completes the proof.
C. The social welfare function
The second term in (3.1) is obviously ￿nite and, hence, well de￿ned. This is,
however, not obvious for the ￿rst term.
There are three cases for longevity development discussed in the paper: (i) upper
bound to longevity, (ii) decreasing growth in longevity, and (iii) constant growth in
longevity. The ￿rst term in (3.1) is obviously ￿nite and well de￿ned if there is an
upper bound to longevity, as is assumed in appendix E below.






where Q(i) is expected discounted lifetime utility at birth for an individual belong-
ing to generation i and v (i) life expectancy at birth of the individual from (2.4). The
ratio
Q(i)
v(i) can be interpreted as the expected discounted utility each year alive at birth
for an individual belonging to generation i, which can be assumed to be stationary.













We therefore have that v (i) is linear in longevity.
Hence, v (i) converges to a constant if the growth in longevity is decreasing over
time. In that case, e￿￿(i￿t) determines whether (C.1) is well de￿ned. Performing a






￿ ￿ ￿ = e￿￿di < 1
and, hence, e￿￿(i￿t) converges to zero and (C.1) is ￿nite and well de￿ned.
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where (2.5) has been used. In this case, e￿￿(i￿t)v (i) determines whether (C.1) is
































￿ ￿ ￿ = 1
Hence, e￿￿(i￿t)v (i) converges to zero, and (C.1) is ￿nite and well de￿ned.
The conclusion is that (C.1) and, hence, (3.1) are ￿nite and well de￿ned.
D. Social optimum derived
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(D.1)
We can now ￿nd the ￿rst-order conditions determining Tw, To and ~ R. For the tax
payment by the young Tw, we have
VD = ￿ 1







U0 (y ￿ Tw)da
or using Nw
￿
~ R; ~ A
￿
from (2.9), we get (3.5) as
VD = ￿U0 (y ￿ Tw)
For the transfer to the old To, we have
VD = ￿ 1










~ R; ~ A
￿
from (2.10), we get (3.6) as
VD = ￿Q0 (To)
For the retirement age ~ R, we have
VDTw
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@No
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￿
from (2.9) and (2.10), we get (3.7) as
[Tw + To]VD = U (y ￿ Tw)+ ~ L
￿
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where it has been used
that @Nw
@ ~ R = ￿@No
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Using the envelope theorem gives
















+ VyD￿yy + V ~ AD^ ￿A
Applying a Taylor approximation to VD, and using the law of motion for D, y and















dt + VDy￿yydt + VD ~ A^ ￿Adt
Evaluating this at T ￿
w, T ￿
o and ~ R￿, plugging into it and using that VDy = VyD and
VD ~ A = V ~ AD (Young￿ s theorem) give (3.8) as
dVD = (￿ ￿ r)VDdt
Above we have shown that (3.5)-(3.7) are necessary conditions for solving the max-
imization problem in (3.4). Now we show that these are also su¢ cient. Denote by F
the function inside the right hand side bracket in (D.1). Then the necessary conditions
in (3.5)-(3.7) are also su¢ cient for maximum if the Hessian matrix corresponding to
the F function is a negative de￿nite. From the F function we have (evaluated at the
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@2F
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@Tw@ ~ R = @2F
@To@ ~ R = 0
which give a negative de￿nite Hessian matrix.
We now show that the HJB equation in (3.4) along with (2.24) (and (2.23)) are
necessary for solving (3.3). First, (2.24) (and (2.23)) is a part of the problem in (3.3)
and is therefore a necessary and su¢ cient condition for its solution. To show that the
HJB equation is necessary, we roughly apply the method used in Bj￿rk (1998), where
necessary conditions for the HJB equation in the stochastic case are proved. Although
the proof in Bj￿rk (1998) can be applied here, we show it below since it gives insights
into how the HJB equation is obtained in our case.
Proof of the HJB equation being a necessary condition












































y (i); ~ A(i);Tw (i);To (i); ~ R(i)
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Optimal Tw (i), To (i) and ~ R(i) are
T ￿
w (i) = Tw
￿
D(i);y (i); ~ A(i)
￿
T ￿
o (i) = To
￿
D(i);y (i); ~ A(i)
￿
~ R￿ (i) = ~ R
￿
D(i);y (i); ~ A(i)
￿
for all i ￿ t. Now consider Tw (i), To (i) and ~ R(i) that are not necessarily optimal
Tw (i) = Tw (i) for t + h ￿ i ￿ t
= T ￿
w (i) 8 i ￿ t + h
To (i) = To (i) for t + h ￿ i ￿ t
= T ￿
o (i) 8 i ￿ t + h
~ R(i) = ~ R(i) for t + h ￿ i ￿ t
= ~ R￿ (i) 8 i ￿ t + h
where h > 0.
The value function at time t is de￿ned as
V
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di
and is assumed to be di⁄erentiable.36 Hence, the value function at time t + h is
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￿
di
If the optimal Tw (i), To (i) and ~ R(i) are chosen, then the value of W (t) in (D.2)
is V
￿
D(t);y (t); ~ A(t)
￿
, while it is the following if Tw (i), To (i) and ~ R(i) that are not
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Comparing these two, we have that the following must hold:
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￿
Rewriting this inequality and dividing by h give
36Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) set forth su¢ cient conditions for the derivatives of the value
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￿i
Taking the limit when h ! 0 on both sides of the inequality sign gives
￿V
￿









D(t);y (t); ~ A(t)
￿
where L￿ Hospital￿ s rule has been used.
This inequality holds for all Tw (t), To (t) and ~ R(t). Further, it holds with the
equality sign if the optimal ones are chosen. This implies
￿V
￿



















which, after using short and notation along with (2.24) (and (2.23)), (2.5) and
(2.20), gives the HJB equation in (3.4), which completes the proof.
We have therefore shown that if there exist optimal Tw (i), To (i) and ~ R(i) and the
value function V
￿
D(t);y (t); ~ A(t)
￿
is di⁄erentiable, then the HJB equation in (3.4)
is a necessary condition for solving (3.3). Hence, we can conclude that if the value
function V
￿
D(t);y (t); ~ A(t)
￿
is di⁄erentiable, then the HJB equation is necessary
for solving (3.3).
E. Upper bound on longevity
We now have that
dA(t) = ￿Adt for A(t) < A
= 0 for A(t) = A (E.1)
or
￿A > 0 for t < t￿
￿A = 0 for t ￿ t￿
where A(t￿) = A and it is used that there is a one-to-one relationship between A
and t. This changes (2.6) and the ~ L, ~ H and ~ m functions such that
A(i ￿ a) = ~ A(i) ￿ ￿A
h
a ￿ ~ A(i)
i
8 i ￿ a ￿ t￿
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~ Wo;j (i;a)da; j = 1;2;3
For Z1 (i) we have i ￿ t￿ and, hence, i ￿ a ￿ t￿. Together with (E.3)-(E.5) this
gives
~ Ww;1 (i;a) = U (y (i) ￿ Tw (i)) + L
￿
a; ~ A(i) ￿ ￿A
h
a ￿ ~ A(i)
i￿
~ Wo;1 (i;a) = Q(To (i)) + H
￿
a; ~ A(i) ￿ ￿A
h








a; ~ A(i) ￿ ￿A
h
a ￿ ~ A(i)
i￿
For Z2 (i) we have t￿ ￿ i ￿ t￿ + A(t￿) and, hence, t￿ ￿ a ￿ i ￿ a ￿ t￿ ￿ a + A(t￿).
Since A(t￿) ￿ a, this implies that there exists an ￿ a(i) for which a S ￿ a(i), and we have





= m(a;A(t￿)) for a ￿ ￿ a(i)
= m
￿
a; ~ A(i) ￿ ￿A
h
a ￿ ~ A(i)
i￿
for ￿ a(i) < a
and if ￿ a(i) ￿ ~ R(i), we have from (E.3)-(E.4)
~ Ww;2 (i;a) = U (y (i) ￿ Tw (i)) + L(a;A(t￿)) for a ￿ ￿ a(i)
= U (y (i) ￿ Tw (i)) + L
￿
a; ~ A(i) ￿ ￿A
h
a ￿ ~ A(i)
i￿
for ￿ a(i) < a
~ Wo;2 (i;a) = Q(To (i)) + H
￿
a; ~ A(i) ￿ ￿A
h
a ￿ ~ A(i)
i￿
and if ￿ a(i) > ~ R(i), we have from (E.3)-(E.4)
~ Ww;2 (i;a) = U (y (i) ￿ Tw (i)) + L(a;A(t￿))
~ Wo;2 (i;a) = Q(To (i)) + H (a;A(t￿)) 8 a ￿ ￿ a(i)
= Q(To (i)) + H
￿
a; ~ A(i) ￿ ￿A
h
a ￿ ~ A(i)
i￿
8 ￿ a(i) < a
For Z3 (i) we have i ￿ t￿ +A(t￿) and, hence, i￿a ￿ t￿. Together with (E.3)-(E.5)
this gives
~ Ww;3 (i;a) = U (y (i) ￿ Tw (i)) + L(a;A(t￿))
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di (E.7)
38where _ x(i) ￿ lim
di!0
dx(i)
di for x(i) = D(i), y (i), ~ A(i) and where Nw and No are given
in (2.9) and (2.10) using the ~ m function from (E.5). Hence, we have
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where j = 1 when i ￿ t￿, j = 2 when t￿ ￿ i ￿ t￿+A(t￿) and j = 3 for i ￿ t￿+A(t￿).
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The ￿rst-order conditions are (for all i ￿ t)
￿e￿￿(i￿t)U0 (y (i) ￿ Tw (i)) + ￿D (i) = 0 (E.9)





U (y (i) ￿ Tw (i)) + ~ L
￿




Q(To (i)) + ~ H
￿
~ R(i); ~ A(i)
￿i
3
5+￿D (i)[Tw (i) + To (i)] = 0 (E.11)
where it has been used that @Nw
@ ~ R(i) = ￿ @No
@ ~ R(i) = ~ mj
￿
~ R(i); ~ A(i)
￿
for j = 1, 2, 3.
Further, maximizing (E.8) with respect to D(i) gives the following ￿rst-order condition
(for all i ￿ t):
￿_ ￿D (i) ￿ ￿D (i)r = 0 (E.12)
Using (E.10) in (E.12) gives
_ To (i) =
Q0(To(i))
Q00(To(i)) [￿ ￿ r]
Assuming neutral generational weighting (￿ = r) gives _ To (i) = 0 and, hence,
To (i) = To (t) (E.13)
for all i ￿ t. Using this, (2.20), (E.9) and (E.10) gives





39for all i ￿ t. Plugging (E.10) into (E.11) gives
Q0 (To (i))[Tw (i) + To (i)] =
h
Q(To (i)) + ~ H
￿




U (y (i) ￿ Tw (i)) + ~ L
￿
~ R(i); ~ A(i)
￿i
for all i ￿ t and, by using (E.13) and (E.14),











@ ~ A(i)￿ @ ~ H
@ ~ A(i)
i
a= ~ R(i) h
@ ~ L





for t￿ + A(t￿) > i ￿ t









for i ￿ t￿ + A(t￿)
Comparing these results to the ones with no upper bound on A(t) from (3.14) and
(3.16), we see that the dynamics in Tw and To are identical, while the dynamics in
~ R di⁄er due to the upper bound. Further, the intertemporal budget constraint from
(3.13) di⁄ers between the two cases since Nw
￿




~ R(i); ~ A(i)
￿
di⁄er
due to di⁄erent development of ~ A(i). Hence, the levels for Tw, To and ~ R di⁄er.
F. A proof for optimal policy package
Proof of proposition 1
(3.10) and (3.11) imply
dTw (i) = dy (i)
dTo (i) = 0
for all i ￿ t. Using (2.20) in these gives (3.14). Using (2.21) and (2.22) along with
(2.20) in (3.14) gives (3.15).
(3.12) and (3.14) imply
VD (t)dTw (i) =
h
@~ L













for all i ￿ t, implying that the retirement age evolves according to
d ~ R(i) =
VD(t) h
@ ~ L







@ ~ A(i)￿ @ ~ H
@ ~ A(i)
i
a= ~ R(i) h
@ ~ L





for all i ￿ t, where VD (t) < 0 from (3.10),
h
@~ L




< 0 from (2.18) and
h
@~ L













￿A (i) = ￿
h
@ ~ L
@ ~ A(i)￿ @ ~ H
@ ~ A(i)
i
a= ~ R(i) h
@ ~ L





for all i ￿ t. This completes the proof.
G. Proofs for retirement and healthy ageing
Proof of lemma 1
"only if"





40for all i ￿ t. The expression for the evolution of the optimal retirement age from




@ ~ A(i)￿ @ ~ H
@ ~ A(i)
i
a= ~ R(i) h
@ ~ L







for all i ￿ t. Assume that the ~ L (a; ~ A(i)) and ~ H(a; ~ A(i)) functions are ho-













































and therefore ~ L
￿





~ R(i); ~ A(i)
￿
due to the homogeneity assumption, which is likely to hold from
(3.10)-(3.12), we have that (G.2) holds only if ￿ = 0. That is, (G.2) holds only if the
~ L and ~ H functions are both homogeneous of degree 0. This completes the ￿rst half of
the proof.
"if"
From (3.12), (3.14) and (2.20) assuming constant output per young individual
(dy (i) = 0) gives
[Tw (t) + To (t)]VD (t) = U (y (t) ￿ Tw (t))
+~ L
￿
~ R(i); ~ A(i)
￿
￿ Q(To (t)) ￿ ~ H
￿
~ R(i); ~ A(i)
￿
(G.3)
for all i ￿ t. Assuming that the ~ L (a; ~ A(i)) and ~ H(a; ~ A(i)) are homogeneous of












This can only hold if
~ R(i)
~ A(i) is constant since @~ L
@a < @ ~ H
@a from (2.18) and (2.19). Hence,
we have that (4.1) must hold. This completes the proof.
Proof of lemma 2
Assuming constant growth in longevity in (2.6) gives the following relationship
between longevity of the generation that retires today and longevity of the generation
that becomes extinct today:
A
￿
i ￿ ~ R
￿
= ~ A(i) ￿ ￿A
h





~ R(i) = ￿ ~ A(i)
holds and plugging into (G.4) give
~ R(i) = ￿
1+￿A[1￿￿]A
￿
i ￿ ~ R
￿
Choosing   = ￿
1+￿A[1￿￿] completes the ￿rst half of the proof.
"if"
Assuming that
~ R(i) =  A
￿
i ￿ ~ R
￿







1+ ￿A completes the second half of the proof. This completes the
proof.
41Proof of lemma 3
"only if"
Using the de￿nition of the ~ L function, (2.6) under constant growth in longevity











ka;k ~ A(i) ￿ ￿A
h






~ A(i) ￿ ￿A
h
a ￿ ~ A(i)
ii￿
= L(ka;kA(i ￿ a))
= k￿L(a;A(i ￿ a))




= L(a;A(i ￿ a))
by de￿nition. Hence, the ~ L function is homogeneous of degree ￿ only if the L function
is also homogeneous of degree ￿. Obviously, a similar proof goes for the H function.
This completes the ￿rst half of the proof.
"if"
Using the de￿nition of the ~ L function, (2.6) under constant growth in longevity
and assuming that the L function is homogeneous of degree ￿ give
k￿L(a;A(i ￿ a))





~ A(i) ￿ ￿A
h






k ~ A(i) ￿ ￿A
h














= L(a;A(i ￿ a))
by de￿nition. Hence, the ~ L function is homogeneous of degree ￿ if the L function is
also homogeneous of degree ￿. Obviously, a similiar proof goes for the H function.
This completes the proof.
Proof of proposition 2
This follows directly from lemmas 1 - 3. This completes the proof.
H. Proofs for dependency ratio
Proof of lemma 4
Plugging (4.6) into (2.9), (2.10) and (2.6) assuming constant growth in longevity,





























where ~ a ￿ a
~ A(i) and
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[1 + K (i)]
It is clear from this that @K
@ ~ A(i) T 0 iff ￿
0 S 0. This completes the proof.
Proof of lemma 5
Assuming that the L and H functions, and, hence, the ~ L and ~ H functions from



























From (4.6) we have that ￿
0 T 0 i⁄ R0 T ￿(i) =
~ R(i)
~ A(i). This implies that ￿
























Assume that the social optimal solution is such that consumption and utility
when young are no less than when old (cw (i) ￿ co (i) and U(cw (i)) ￿ Q(co (i))),
which implies from (3.12) that ~ H
￿

















due to the homogeneity assumption. We therefore have that
￿
0 = 0 i⁄ ￿ = 0 since
h
@~ L





~ A(i); ~ A(i)=1
< 0 from (2.18) and (2.19). Further, we
have that @LHS
@￿ ￿=0 < 0 and, hence, ￿
0 > 0 (< 0) when (and only when) ￿ is slightly
less (greater) than zero. The general result is ￿
0 S 0 iff ￿ T 0. This completes the
proof.
Proof of proposition 3
This follows directly from lemmas 4 - 5. This completes the proof.
I. Decentralized equilibrium
Individual problem
Let us consider an individual born at time j, i.e., he belongs to generation j. His









where output y (j) is assumed to be constant (= y), Ww (j + a;a) and Wo (j + a;a)
are given in (2.12) and (2.15), respectively, and m(a;A(j)) is from (2.3). His problem
is one of choosing consumption over his life and retirement age, conditional on pro￿les
for taxes collected from young Tw (j + a) and transfers to old To (j + a) during the
maximum length of life of individuals from his generation a 2 [0;A(j)] such that his






Assuming that he has no initial assets, his budget constraint reads
R(j) Z
a=0
e￿ram(a;A(j))[y ￿ Tw (j + a)]da +
A(j) Z
a=R(j)




e￿ram(a;A(j))cw (j + a)da +
A(j) Z
a=R(j)
e￿ram(a;A(j))co (j + a)da (I.3)
Since we want to focus on the market failure caused by missing market for lending
from future generations to present, we assume that there exits an annuities market (as
in Yaari, 1965) to eliminate the market failure caused by uncertain lifetime (see, for
example, Blanchard (1985) and Sheshinski, (2008)). This implies that an individual
born at any time j buys or sells annuities at any age a. The amount of annuities held
by the individual is n(j + a;a) and the amount purchased (sold) is _ n(j + a;a) > 0
(_ n(j + a;a) < 0), where _ n(j + a;a) ￿ lim
da!0
dn(j+a;a)
da . The price of a unit of annuities
is 1, and its instantaneous return is r + ’(j + a;a) to an individual aged a and born
in time j, where it is assumed that the interest rate facing individuals r is the same
as for the government. Annuities owned by an individual expire when he dies.
Applying the results in Sheshinski (2008) here, a su¢ cient condition for (I.3) to
hold is that the following holds:
_ n(j + a;a) = [r + ’(j + a;a)]n(j + a;a)
+y ￿ Tw (j + a) ￿ cw (j + a) (I.4)
for 0 ￿ a ￿ R(j),
_ n(j + a;a) = [r + ’(j + a;a)]n(j + a;a)
+To (j + a) ￿ co (j + a) (I.5)
for R(j) < a ￿ A(j) and
n(j + A(j);A(j)) = 0 (I.6)




m(a;A(j)) > 0 (I.7)
The right hand side of the last equation is the hazard rate for an individual aged
a born at time j; i.e., the probability that an individual dies at age a conditional on
being alive at age a. This implies that ’(j + a;a) > 0 and that the interest rate on
annuities is higher than the interest rate r.37 The ￿rst equality states that if alive at
maximum age A(j), the individual will not hold any annuities since he knows that he
will die with certainty.






> > > > > > > <









> > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > ;
(I.8)
37This condition ensures that expected pro￿ts of insurance ￿rms are zero. Insurance ￿rms are
willing to pay higher interest rate on annuities than r since a fraction ’ of annuities holders will die
and, hence, the insurance ￿rms will not have to pay back the amount of their holding of annuities.
In equilibrium, this has to equal the hazard rate to eliminate all pro￿t in the market for annuities.




Assuming interior solution, this gives the following ￿rst-order conditions for the
optimal cw, co and R, respectively:38
e￿￿(j+a;a)U0 (cw (j + a)) + ￿n (j + a;a) = 0 (I.9)
for 0 ￿ a ￿ R(j),
e￿￿(j+a;a)Q0 (co (j + a)) + ￿n (j + a;a) = 0 (I.10)
for R(j) < a ￿ A(j) and
e￿￿(j+R;R) [U (cw (j + R)) + L(R(j);A(j))]￿e￿￿(j+R;R) [Q(co (j + R)) + H (R(j);A(j))]
= ￿n (j + R;R)[y ￿ Tw (j + R) ￿ cw (j + R)]￿￿n (j + R;R)[To (j + R) ￿ co (j + R)]
(I.11)
where ￿n (j + a;a) (a 2 [0;A(j)]) is a Lagrange multiplier (costate variable). Fur-
ther, this gives the following law of motion for the multiplier:
￿_ ￿n (j + a;a) ￿ ￿n (j + a;a)[r + ’(j + a;a)] = 0 (I.12)
for all a 2 [0;A(j)].
From (I.9)-(I.10) and (I.12) we have
_ cw (j + a) = ￿
U0(￿)
U00(￿) [r ￿ ￿]
_ co (j + a) = ￿
Q0(￿)
Q00(￿) [r ￿ ￿]
for all a 2 [0;R(j)] and a 2 (R(j);A(j)], respectively. Using the assump-
tion of neutral generational weighting from above (￿ = r) implies that _ cw (j + a) =
_ co (j + a) = 0 and consumption is constant over age when an individual is young
and when he is old. Using these results in (I.9)-(I.11) gives e￿￿(j+a;a)U0 (cw (j)) +
￿n (j + a;a) = 0 (I.13)
for 0 ￿ a ￿ R(j),
e￿￿(j+a;a)Q0 (co (j)) + ￿n (j + a;a) = 0 (I.14)
for R(j) < a ￿ A(j) and
e￿￿(j+R;R) [U (cw (j)) + L(R(j);A(j))] ￿ e￿￿(j+R;R) [Q(co (j)) + H (R(j);A(j))]
= ￿n (j + R;R)[y ￿ Tw (j + R) ￿ cw (j)] ￿ ￿n (j + R;R)[To (j + R) ￿ co (j)] (I.15)
The solution to the individual problem is characterized by cw (j), co (j) and R(j)
conditional on pro￿les for taxes collected from young individuals (Tw (j + a)) and
transfers to old ones (To (j + a)) during the maximum length of life of individuals
from his generation (a 2 [0;A(j)]) that satisfy (I.13)-(I.15) as well as the intertemporal
budget constraint in (I.3). This has to hold for individuals born at any time j, i.e., it
has to hold for any generation j.
From (I.13)-(I.15) and (I.3), the optimal consumption when young and old and
the retirement age can be written as implicit functions of taxes, transfers and the
maximum length of life of individuals from the generation in question
cw (j) = Cw
￿





co (j) = Co
￿












As is shown in appendix J below by use of the implicit function theorem, these
functions exist. Further, as is shown in appendix J, comparative static analysis reveals
38The ￿rst-order conditions and the law of motion for the shadow price of annuities are derived in
appendix J below.
45that the signs of the ￿rst derivatives are generally indeterminate and depend on the
levels of the variables in equilibrium.
Government
At every point in time t, the government decides on the tax levied on the young/working
and the transfer to the old/non-working now and in the future fTw (i);To (i)g
1
i=t (the
policy package) such that its welfare objective from (3.2) (see discussion in the next
paragraph) is maximized. In doing so, it is constrained by its budget constraint from
(2.24) (and (2.23)), the path for longevity from (2.5) and individual behaviour from
(I.16)-(I.18).
Consumption di⁄ers between generations in the decentralized equilibrium since
generations are heterogeneous. This is re￿ ected in (I.16)-(I.18) for a given policy
package since A(j) di⁄ers between generations. Hence, at a given point in time,
consumption is not only time but also age dependent since a given age a represents a
given generation t ￿ a at a given point in time t. (2.12) and (2.15) therefore become





Wo(t;a) = Q(co (t ￿ a)) + H (a;A(t ￿ a)) 8 a 2
￿
~ R(t); ~ A(t)
i
(I.20)
Hence, the welfare objective di⁄ers slightly from the one in (3.2).
Optimal policy package
As in the social planner problem, the optimal policy problem here is solved by
setting up the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation which in short hand writing








> > > > > > > > > > <






























> > > > > > > > > > =

















d ~ A = ^ ￿Adt



















with Nw and No given from (2.9) and (2.10), respectively, and ^ ￿A ￿
￿A
1+￿A as
before. Assuming interior solution, this gives the following ￿rst-order conditions for
the optimal Tw and To, respectively:39
VD =
~ m( ~ R; ~ A)





















~ R; ~ A
￿
￿ VD [Tw + To]
3
5 @ ~ R
@Tw
39The ￿rst-order conditions and the law of motion for the marginal value function are derived in
appendix K below.
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~ m( ~ R; ~ A)





















~ R; ~ A
￿
￿ VD [Tw + To]
3
5 @ ~ R
@To
￿ 1





















Further, this gives the following law of motion for the marginal value function
(relaxing the short hand writing):
dVD(￿) = (￿ ￿ r)VDdt (I.24)




D(i);y (i); ~ A(i)
￿
= 0 (I.25)
for all i ￿ t, i.e., the optimal policy package is such that the marginal value function
VD(￿) is the same for all i ￿ t. Applying this to (I.22) and (I.23) gives
VD (t) =
~ m( ~ R(i); ~ A(i))





















~ R(i); ~ A(i)
￿
￿ VD (t)[Tw (i) + To (i)]
3
5 @ ~ R(i)
@Tw(i)
+ 1


















Q0 (co (i ￿ a))
@co(i￿a)
@Tw(i) da (I.26)
VD (t) = ￿
~ m( ~ R(i); ~ A(i))





















~ R(i); ~ A(i)
￿
￿ VD (t)[Tw (i) + To (i)]
3
5 @ ~ R(i)
@To(i)
￿ 1


















Q0 (co (i ￿ a))
@co(i￿a)
@To(i) da (I.27)
for all i ￿ t, where VD (t) is written as a function of t to indicate that it is the same
for all i ￿ t.
47An optimal policy package fTw (i);To (i)g
1
i=t must satisfy (I.26) and (I.27) as well
as the intertemporal budget constraint from the social planner problem in (3.13).
J. Decentralized equilibrium derived











￿n (j + a;a)
2
4
_ n(j + a;a)
￿
￿
[r + ’(j + a;a)]n(j + a;a)







￿n (j + a;a)
2
4
_ n(j + a;a)
￿
￿
[r + ’(j + a;a)]n(j + a;a)




where Ww (j + a;a) and Wo (j + a;a) are given in (2.12) and (2.15), respectively.











￿n (j + a;a)
￿
[r + ’(j + a;a)]n(j + a;a)






￿n (j + a;a)
￿
[r + ’(j + a;a)]n(j + a;a)
+To (j + a) ￿ co (j + a)
￿
da




_ ￿n (j + a;a)n(j + a;a)da




_ ￿n (j + a;a)n(j + a;a)da
The ￿rst-order conditions are
e￿￿(i+a;a)U0 (cw (i + a)) + ￿n (i + a;a) = 0
for 0 ￿ a ￿ R(j),
e￿￿(j+a;a)Q0 (co (j + a)) + ￿n (j + a;a) = 0
for R(j) < a ￿ A(j) and
e￿￿(j+R;R) [U (cw (j + R)) + L(R(j);A(j))]￿e￿￿(j+R;R) [Q(co (j + R)) + H (R(j);A(j))]
= ￿n (j + R;R)[y ￿ Tw (j + R) ￿ cw (j + R)]￿￿n (j + R;R)[To (j + R) ￿ co (j + R)]
which give (I.9), (I.10) and (I.11), respectively. Further, the ￿rst-order condition
with respect to n(j + a;a) is
￿_ ￿n (j + a;a) ￿ ￿n (j + a;a)[r + ’(j + a;a)] = 0
for 0 ￿ a ￿ A(j), which gives (I.12).
48Eliminating the costate variable from (I.13)-(I.15) and performing comparative
static analysis using the resulting two equations and (I.3) with cw (j), co (j) and R(j)




































@Tw(j+a) = U00 (￿)Q00 (￿)
￿1 @cw(j)
@Tw(j+a) < 0 for 0 ￿ a < R(j)
@co(j)




@To(j+a) = U00 (￿)Q00 (￿)
￿1 @cw(j)
@To(j+a) > 0 for R(j) < a ￿ A(j)
@co(j)



























a=R(j) nom2 < 0





















a=R(j) > 0 by assumption.
Note that nom1 = Q(￿)￿U (￿)+[H (￿;￿) ￿ L(￿;￿)]a=R(j) is the increase in instantaneous
utility from retiring. Also note that the denominator (den) in the derivatives is always
non-zero and, hence, the conditions of the implicit function theorem are ful￿lled.40
K. Optimal policy package derived


























+ V ~ A^ ￿A
i
dt
Inserting this into (I.21) gives
40It is, of course, also assumed that all the derivatives of the equilibrium conditions in (I.13)-(I.15)
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+ V ~ A^ ￿A
9
> > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > ;
(K.1)
We can now ￿nd the ￿rst-order conditions determining Tw and To. For the tax
payment by the young Tw, we have
~ m
￿



















































@ ~ R Tw ￿ @No










~ R; ~ A
￿
from (2.10) and that @Nw
@ ~ R = ￿@No
@ ~ R =
~ m
￿
~ R; ~ A
￿
, we get (I.22) as
VD =
~ m( ~ R; ~ A)





















~ R; ~ A
￿
￿ VD [Tw + To]
3
5 @ ~ R
@Tw
+ 1





















For the transfer to the old To, we have
~ m
￿



















































@ ~ R Tw ￿ @No










~ R; ~ A
￿
from (2.10) and that @Nw
@ ~ R = ￿@No
@ ~ R =
~ m
￿
~ R; ~ A
￿
, we get (I.23) as
50VD = ￿
~ m( ~ R; ~ A)





















~ R; ~ A
￿
￿ VD [Tw + To]
3
5 @ ~ R
@To
￿ 1





















Replacing Tw and To with their optimal values from (I.22) and (I.23) gives the
optimal values for the endogenous variables ~ R, cw (￿a) and cw (￿a): ~ R￿, c￿
w (￿a) and
c￿







> > > > > > > > > > <










































+ V ~ A^ ￿A
9
> > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > ;
Using the envelope theorem gives
















+ V ~ AD^ ￿A
Applying a Taylor approximation to VD and using the law of motion for D and ~ A















dt + VD ~ A^ ￿Adt
Evaluating this at ~ R￿, c￿
w (￿a) and c￿
o (￿a), plugging into it and using that VDy =
VyD and VD ~ A = V ~ AD (Young￿ s theorem) give (I.24) as
dVD = (￿ ￿ r)VDdt
L. Retirement age comparison
Partial equilibrium e⁄ects
According to the decentralized equilibrium, a generation born at time i￿Rd retires






























i ￿ ~ Rd
￿￿h
y ￿ Tw (i) ￿ To (i) ￿ cw
￿




i ￿ ~ Rd
￿i
(L.1)
Using (2.21), (2.22), (3.10)-(3.12) and the de￿nition of the ~ L and ~ H functions give
that, according to the social planner￿ s solution, the generation born at l ￿ Rs retires
at age Rs at time l such that following holds:




l ￿ ~ Rs
￿￿




l ￿ ~ Rs
￿￿
=
U0 (cw (t))[y ￿ cw (t) + co (t)] (L.2)
In both the decentralized equilibrium and the social planner￿ s solution, consump-
tion when young and consumption when old are constant over time for a given gen-
eration, and the di⁄erence in consumption and utility depends only on the utility
51functions, i.e., U (￿) and Q(￿), respectively. Hence, we can use that
co (t) = !ccw (t)
Q(co (t)) = !uU (cw (t))
for the social planner￿ s solution and
co
￿
















i ￿ ~ Rd
￿￿
for the decentralized equilibrium, where !c;!u ￿ 1 since it is assumed as before
that consumption and utility of young individuals are no less than of old individuals.


















i ￿ ~ Rd
￿￿









i ￿ ~ Rd
￿

















l ￿ ~ Rs
￿￿
=
U0 (cw (t))y ￿ U0 (cw (t))[1 ￿ !c]cw (t) + [1 ￿ !u]U (cw (t)) (L.4)
Let us consider a given generation such that l ￿ Rs = i ￿ Rd and compare its
retirement age under the two schemes. When comparing (L.3) and (L.4), the left hand
sides only vary with the retirement ages ~ Rd (i) and ~ Rs (l) since we are looking at a
given generation and, hence, A
￿




l ￿ ~ Rs
￿
. Further, we have from (2.18)
that
@[H(￿;￿)￿L(￿;￿)]





i ￿ ~ Rd
￿￿









i ￿ ~ Rd
￿




i ￿ ~ Rd
￿￿
T
U0 (c(t))y ￿ U0 (cw (t))[1 ￿ !c]cw (t) + [1 ￿ !u]U (cw (t))
Assuming that the same consumption levels arise in the social planner￿ s and de-
centralized equilibrium allocation, we have that the retirement age di⁄ers since
Rs R Rd for Tw (i) + To (i) R 0
which gives (5.1).
General equilibrium e⁄ects
How does the retirement age change if the economy starts where (L.4) holds such
that cw
￿
i ￿ ~ Rd
￿
= cw (t) and ~ Rd (i) = ~ Rs (l) and moves to where (L.3) holds where
Tw (i) ! 0 and To (i) ! 0 (and, hence, dTw (i) ! 0 and dTo (i) ! 0)? Let us assume
for simplicity that consumption and utility functions are identical when individuals
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5
< 0 (L.6)
as can be veri￿ed using the results of the comparative static analysis in appendix
J. All the derivatives are evaluated at the social planner￿ s solution.
The second term on the right hand side of (L.5) gives the direct e⁄ect discussed
above; i.e., the retirement age decreases when the economy moves away from the social
planner￿ s solution such that Tw (i)+To (i) becomes positive, while the ￿rst terms give
the consumption e⁄ects. Using (L.6), it is clear that these two e⁄ects work in opposite























which always holds. Hence, the direct e⁄ects are always stronger than the consump-
tion e⁄ects and the retirement age decreases when the economy moves away from the
social planner￿ s solution such that Tw (i) + To (i) > 0. Note that this analysis is only
meant to give an idea about how the retirement age is in the decentralized equilibrium
compared to in the social planner￿ s solution since all the derivatives are evaluated at
the social planner￿ s solution.
M. Proof for decentralizing the social planner￿ s allocation
Proof of proposition 4.
The proof proceeds by assuming that the optimal policy package gives the socially
optimal allocation and shows that a contradiction emerges.
From the social planner￿ s solution, we have that (3.10)-(3.12) and (3.15) have to
hold. Plugging (3.15) into (3.10)-(3.12) and the resulting equations and (3.15) into
(I.26)-(I.27) gives
1 = ￿ 1










































No( ~ R(i); ~ A(i))
2
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Nw( ~ R(i); ~ A(i))
2
6 6



























7 7 7 7 7
5
(M.1)
Plugging into (M.1) using the results of the comparative static analysis in appendix
J, the de￿nition of the ~ m function from (2.7) and the assumption that the optimal
policy package gives the same allocation as the social planner￿ s solution, we have
1
No( ~ R(i); ~ A(i))
2
6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6


























1 + U00 (￿)Q00 (￿)
￿1￿
e￿r ~ R(i) ~ m
￿










den(i￿ ~ R) da
3
7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7





Nw( ~ R(i); ~ A(i))
2
6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6


























1 + U00 (￿)Q00 (￿)
￿1￿
e￿r ~ R(i) ~ m
￿









den(i￿ ~ R) da
3
7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7 7




where den(i ￿ a) < 0 for all 0 ￿ a ￿ ~ A(i).
Simplifying (M.2) and using (2.9), (2.10) give
54[Nw (i) ￿ No (i)]
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1 + U00 (￿)Q00 (￿)
￿1￿
e￿r ~ R(i) ~ m
￿















Note that due to the continuous time setup we have that da ! 0 and, hence, that
RHS ! 0. Also note that LHS = 0 i⁄ Nw (i) = No (i). Hence, (M.3) holds only if
the number of young individuals is very close to the number of old and a contradiction
emerges. This completes the proof.
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